Efficiency and risk in european banking by Fiordelisi, Franco et al.
Working PaPer SerieS
no 1211 / June 2010
efficiency and  
riSk in euroPean 
banking




RESEARCH NETWORKWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1211 / JUNE 2010
In 2010 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€500 banknote.
EFFICIENCY AND RISK 
IN EUROPEAN BANKING
by Franco Fiordelisi  , David Marques-Ibanez  
and Phil Molyneux 
 Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, University of Rome III, Via S. D’Amico 77, 00182, Rome, Italy, 
phone: +39 065 733 5672; fax: +39 065 733 5797, e-mail: fiordelisi@uniroma3.it.
 Bangor Business School,  University,   Bangor  College Road, LL572DJ, Bangor, United Kingdom, 
e mail: p.molyneux@bangor.ac.uk.
Kaiserstrasse 29,
 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, e-mail: david.marques@ecb.europa.eu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science 
Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1618296.
NOTE: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing 
the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The views expressed are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
1   We    ould like to thank in particular an anonymous referee for insightful and helpful comments particularly   ith regard the various estimation
 issues.   he authors   ould also like to thank among others Alessandro Carretta, Francesco Cesarini, John Fell,   hilipp   artmann, Claudia
 Girardone, Giorgio Gobbi, Marcella Lucchetta, Adrian van Rixtel, Klaus Schaeck, Roberto Violi, John Wilson and Giuseppe   adra   ho
 kindly provided comments on earlier versions of this paper as   ell as participants at seminars at the European Central Bank and
 Banca d Italia.  Special   thanks also to participants at SUERF and Banque Centrale du Luxembourg conference on    roductivity in
 the Financial Services Sector     as   ell as participants at Associa  ione Bancaria Italiana   ABI   and Ente Einaudi Workshop on























 comments. All errors and omissions as usual rest    ith the authors.     w
-
MACROPRUDENTIAL 
RESEARCH NETWORK© European Central Bank, 2010
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or produced 
electronically, in whole or in part, is 
permitted only with the explicit written 
authorisation of the ECB or the authors. 
Information on all of the papers published 
in the ECB Working Paper Series can be 






This paper presents research conducted within the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs). The network is composed of econo-
mists from the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), i.e. the 27 national central banks of the European Union (EU) and the Euro-
pean Central Bank. The objective of MaRs is to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and/or tools supporting macro-prudential 
supervision in the EU. 
The research is carried out in three work streams:
1. Macro-ﬁ  nancial models linking ﬁ  nancial stability and the performance of the economy;
2.  Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators;
3.  Assessing contagion risks.
MaRs is chaired by Philipp Hartmann (ECB). Paolo Angelini (Banca d’Italia), Laurent Clerc (Banque de France), Carsten Detken 
(ECB) and Katerina Šmídková (Czech National Bank) are workstream coordinators. Xavier Freixas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) acts 
as external consultant and Angela Maddaloni (ECB) as Secretary.
The refereeing process of this paper has been coordinated by a team composed of Cornelia Holthausen, Kalin Nikolov and Bernd 
Schwaab (all ECB). 
The paper is released in order to make the research of MaRs generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and sug-
gestions prior to ﬁ  nal publication. The views expressed in the paper are the ones of the author(s) and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those 
of the ECB or of the ESCB. 3
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1211
June 2010
Abstract  4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  6
2 Related  literature  8
3 Research  hypothesis  11
4 Methodology  13
5  Variables and data  16
6 Results  19
7 Robustness  tests  21














We analyze the impact of efficiency on bank risk. We also consider whether bank capital has 
an effect on this relationship. We model the inter-temporal relationships among efficiency, 
capital and risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the European Union. We 
find that reductions in cost and revenue efficiencies increase banks’ future risks thus 
supporting the bad management and efficiency version of the moral hazard hypotheses. In 
contrast, bank efficiency improvements contribute to shore up bank capital levels. Our 
findings suggest that banks lagging behind in their efficiency levels might expect higher risk 
and subdued capital positions in the near future.   
Keywords: banking risk; capital; efficiency 
JEL classification: G21; D24; C23; E44 5
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Following a process of de-regulation and innovation in credit markets over the two decades 
prior to the credit crisis that started in late 2007 European banking markets became increasingly 
integrated and more competitive. As a result of this process, there have been stronger pressures on 
banks’ capital and a stronger emphasis on the importance of improved efficiency in the banking 
sector. That is, it forced banks to operate closer to the “best practice” or efficient production function.  
Our aim is, first, to assess the impact of efficiency on bank risk. In this respect low levels of 
efficiency could lead banks to try to boost their performance via laxer credit standards and/or less 
intensive monitoring of credit. In turn, we will also have to consider if changes in bank risk have an 
influence on their efficiency levels. For instance, increases in bank risk may temporally precede a 
decline in cost efficiency related to lower credit screening.  
Second, we aim to assess the impact of bank capital on the risk and efficiency trade-offs. Namely the 
relationship between efficiency and risk might be affected by the level of capital particularly in light 
of the decline of overall bank capital (as a proportion of total loans) at the macroeconomic level. For 
instance, moral hazard problems might increase incentives of thinly capitalized banks to augment 
their level of risk thereby incurring higher non-performing loans in the future.  
To tackle these questions, we build on previous literature and asses the inter-temporal relationships 
between bank risk, efficiency and capital levels.
2 We use a large data set of European Union 
commercial banks from 26 European Union countries (EU-26) ranging from 1995 to 2007.    
We use Granger-causality methods (Berger and De Young 1997, Williams 2004) in a panel data 
framework. Our model delves in the relationship between these factors by including several 
definitions of bank efficiency (i.e. cost, revenue and profit efficiency scores), risk (i.e. non-
performing loans and probability of default) and capital (i.e. core equity and total capital).  
In general, our results show that subdued bank efficiency (cost or revenue) Granger causes higher risk 
supporting the “bad management” hypothesis. We also show that increases in bank capital precede 
cost efficiency improvements suggesting that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital 
increases. Cost (and profit) efficiencies are also found to positively Granger-cause bank capital. In 
other words more efficient banks seem to eventually become more capitalized and higher capital also 
tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels. 
Overall we believe our results to be particularly interesting from a prudential supervisory perspective. 
The findings showing that low efficiency scores can harbinger future banking problems and that 
efficiency improvements tend to shore up banks’ capital positions could be useful from a policy 
perspective. They emphasize the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains also to support 
financial stability objectives. 
                                                 
2 We focus on bank risk-taking, efficiency and capital level since these factors are free of measurement errors. Regarding the 
bank competition, there are various measures available (Goddard and Wilson, 2009), but it is still debated which one is the 
most accurate (Carbo et al., 2009). 6
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Over the last two decades prior to the credit crisis that started in late 2007, European banking 
markets became increasingly integrated. The twin forces of deregulation and technological 
change contributed to the progressive process of financial integration and increased 
competition in the financial services industry (ECB, 2010).
3 As a result of this process, there 
has been a tremendous emphasis on the importance of improved efficiency in the banking 
sector. That is, it has forced banks to operate closer to the “best practice” or efficient 
production function. At the same time, this increase in competition could – at least in the 
short term – lead to greater (and possibly excessive) risk-taking. This is because increased 
competition reduces the market power of banks thereby decreasing their charter value. The 
decline in banks´ charter values coupled with the banks’ limited liability and the existence of 
‘quasi’ flat rate deposit insurance could encourage banks to take on more risk (Matutes and 
Vives, 2000 and Salas and Saurina, 2003).
4 Regulators have tried to counterbalance these 
possible incentives by giving capital adequacy a more prominent role in the prudential 
regulatory process.
5 
In this environment a number of studies have focused on the impact of capital 
(Repullo, 2004; Allen et al., 2009; Gropp and Heider, 2010), operating efficiency (Casu and 
Girardone, 2009a) and business models (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) on bank risk.
6 
                                                 
3 See Goddard et al (2007). 
4 This issue is not undisputed; Boyd and Nicolo (2005) argue that the theoretical foundations linking more competition with 
increased incentives towards bank risk-taking are fragile. See Carletti and Hartmann (2002) for a useful survey of the 
literature linking competition and stability.  
5 For instance, in the aftermath of the introduction of the euro, Vives (2000, pg. 15) already argued that ‘the general trend is 
to introduce competition in banking and to check risk- taking with capital requirements and appropriate supervision’. 
6 A parallel literature has analysed the impact of bank competition on banks’ risk and efficiency (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo, 
2003; De Nicolo et al., 2008, Cihak, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2009, Casu and Girardone, 2009). 7
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Surprisingly, there are only a limited number of studies that assess inter-temporal relationships 
between bank risk, capital and efficiency. The recent credit crisis has highlighted the need for 
further understanding of the determinants of bank risk in an environment of enhanced bank 
efficiency and lower bank capital (Haldane and Alessandri, 2009). 
Our aim is, first, to assess the impact of efficiency on bank risk. In this respect low 
levels of efficiency could lead banks to try to boost their performance via laxer standards 
and/or less intensive monitoring of credit.
7 In turn, we will also have to consider if changes in 
bank risk have an influence on efficiency levels. For instance, increases in bank risk may 
temporally precede a decline in cost efficiency related to lower credit screening.  
Second, we aim to assess the impact of bank capital on risk and efficiency trade-offs. 
Namely, the relationship between efficiency and risk might be affected by the level of capital 
particularly in light of a decline in overall bank capital (as a proportion of total loans) at the 
macroeconomic level. For instance, moral hazard problems might increase incentives of 
thinly capitalized banks to augment their level of risk thereby incurring higher non-
performing loans in the future. Similarly, highly capitalized banks may be subject to lower 
moral hazard problems and may be both more efficient and prudent than thinly capitalized 
institutions. Conversely, as capital is costly highly capitalized banks may, on average, 
increase their level of risk to maximize revenues. 
To tackle these questions, we build on previous literature and assess the inter-
temporal relationships between bank risk, efficiency and capital levels. We use a large data 
set of banks from 26 European Union countries (EU-26) ranging from 1995 to 2007. Our main 
variables of interest include both forward and backward-looking measures of bank risk, several 
measures of bank capital and three bank efficiency measures (revenue, cost and profit 
efficiencies). 
                                                 
7 See section 3 for a detailed description of the main hypotheses. 8
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 includes a literature review 
while section 3 presents the main hypotheses of interest. The model specification, variables 
and data are explained in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, section 7 
presents the robustness checks and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
Bankruptcies in the financial sector are costly, not only for banks’ equity and debt holders but 
often also for taxpayers. As a result the study of the determinants of banks’ risk and, in 
particular, of the effectiveness of forcing banks to hold a certain amount of capital (to 
buttress bank stability) has a long history. An early line of US research on risk-taking 
incentives examined the effects of capital regulations (e.g. Peltzman, 1970 or Mayne, 1972).
8 
The main concern of these early studies was to analyse the effectiveness of financial 
regulation and, especially, to consider whether the existence of a flat-rate deposit insurance 
scheme (i.e. not linked to banks’ risk) created incentives for excessive risk. Overall, results 
from these earlier studies were sceptical about the effectiveness of banking capital regulation 
influencing banks’ soundness (see Marcus, 1983).  
The introduction of the 1988 Basel Accord on international bank capital standards 
(Basel I) reignited interest on the effectiveness of bank capital regulations. A new wave of 
studies (mostly for the US banking sector)
9 tended to find that regulatory capital constraints 
were buttressing banks’ capital (e.g. Wall and Peterson, 1987 and Dahl and Shrieves, 1990). 
In the aftermath of the Basel I application and subsequent amendments, the interest on the 
effects of capital adequacy regulations on banks´ risk persisted. For instance, Ediz et al., 
(1997) found that bank capital regulation had been effective in increasing capital ratios 
                                                 
8 Most of these earlier approaches build on Friedman’s (1962) capital adjustment model. 
9 One exception is Barrios and Blanco (2003). 9
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without substantially shifting bank portfolios and off-balance-sheet (OBS) exposures towards 
riskier assets in the US and UK. In this direction also, Demsetz et al., (1996) and Salas and 
Saurina (2003) found that banks with lower capital tended to operate with higher levels of 
credit risk in line with the moral hazard hypothesis.  
In parallel, and depending on the focus and modelling strategy, the theoretical 
literature offers contradictory results as to the effects of capital requirements on bank risk-
taking incentives (see Berger et al., 1995; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Santos, 1999; Boot et 
al., 1998). Overall then, the issue of whether higher capital ratios reduce overall banking risk 
has remained largely unresolved.  
A major contribution to the debate came from Hughes and Mester (1998, 2009) who 
argued for the need to consider bank efficiency when analysing the relationship between 
capital and risk. According to Hughes and Mester (1998, 2009) both capital and risk are 
likely to be determined by the level of bank efficiency. For instance, supervisory authorities 
may allow efficient banks (with high quality management) a greater flexibility in terms of 
their capital leverage or overall risk profile, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a less 
efficient bank with low capital may be tempted to take on higher risk to compensate for lost 
returns due to moral hazard considerations. 
In this line Berger and De Young (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) posit that it 
is crucial to recognise explicitly the concept of bank efficiency in empirical models analysing 
the determinants of banks´ risk.
10 Berger and De Young (1997) employ Granger-causality 
methods to assess the inter-temporal relationships among problem loans, cost efficiency, and 
capital for a sample of US banks from 1985 to 1994. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) use a 
simultaneous equation framework to test hypotheses about the interrelationships between 
                                                 
10 Pastor and Serrano (2005) also examine the link between efficiency and risk-taking. 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1211
June 2010
bank risk, capitalization, and operating efficiency. Both papers provide evidence that both 
efficiency and capital are relevant determinants of bank risk.  
Berger and De Young (1997) show that declines in cost efficiency precede increases 
in problem loans (particularly at thinly capitalised banks). They also show that problem loans 
result in reductions in cost efficiency. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) also found that poorly 
performing banks are more vulnerable to risk-taking. They also find that that highly 
capitalised banks are more efficient than less capitalised institutions.  
Williams (2004) and Altunbas et al., (2007) have replicated both papers in a European 
banking setting. Similar to Berger and De Young (1997), Williams (2004) uses Granger-
causality techniques to assess the inter-temporal relationships among problem loans, cost 
efficiency, and financial capital. His sample includes European savings banks over the period 
1990-1998 and finds that poorly managed banks tend to make more poor quality loans. 
Altunbas et al., (2007) follow an approach similar to Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and use a 
static simultaneous equation framework to investigate the relationship between capital, loan 
provisions and cost efficiency for a sample of European banks over the period 1992-2000. In 
stark contrast to Williams (2004), Altunbas et al., (2007) do not find a positive relationship 
between inefficiency and bank risk-taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more 
capital and take on less risk. Overall, the European studies yield contradictory findings as to 
the relationships between operating efficiency, capital and bank risk.  
This paper sheds light on the relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in 
the European Union extending the established literature in three dimensions. First unlike 
previous studies our sample includes contemporaneous banking data from the 2000s. That is, 
for the first time the data also covers the period of monetary union that has led to radical 
changes in the European financial system increasing banks’ pressures towards operate more 
efficiently (Goddard et al., 2007, Bos and Schmiedel, 2007). Second, compared with earlier 11
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studies we investigate the risk-efficiency-capital relationships by constructing a broader set of 
variables accounting for each of these concepts. While previous studies mostly focus either on 
cost efficiency (e.g. Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997, Berger and DeYoung 1997, Williams 2004, 
Altunbas et al., 2007) or profit efficiency (Berger and Bonaccorsi 2006), we estimate both cost 
and revenue efficiency estimators (and do robustness checks with a profit efficiency measure). We 
focus on cost and revenue efficiencies as they reflect two different managerial abilities (i.e. 
the abilities to maximize revenues and minimize costs respectively). We posit that each of 
these measures can have a different link with bank risk and capital levels (see section 3). In 
line with previous studies we include a measure of bank risk derived from banks’ financial 
statements (i.e. non-performing loans and total loans). We complement this measure with a 
forward-looking indicator of bank risk capturing the financial markets’ view of banks’ 
likelihood of default obtained from Moodys-KMV. Compared to previous studies we also resort 
to a wider measure of bank capital (i.e. total capital instead of equity capital). Finally, we also 
extend the earlier literature by using an econometric modelling framework that embeds Granger 
causality estimations in a GMM framework.
11 Previous studies mostly rely on OLS 
estimation but this may be problematic since the introduction of a lagged dependent variable 
among the predictors creates complications as the lagged dependent variable is often strongly 
correlated with the disturbance term.  
 
3. Research hypotheses  
 
Before introducing the empirical model and building on previous studies, we posit the major 
research hypotheses about the inter-temporal relationship between bank risk, capital and 
efficiency building on Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997. 
                                                 
11 See Casu and Girardone (2009) for an application of this estimation procedure to banking. 12
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Banks’ efficiency levels may impact on future bank risk. In what Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), and Williams (2004) labeled as the “bad management” hypothesis, banks 
operating with low levels of efficiency have higher costs largely due to inadequate credit 
monitoring and inefficient control of operating expenses (which is reflected in lower cost 
efficiency almost immediately). Declines in cost (and revenue) efficiency will temporally 
precede increases in banks’ risk due to credit, operational, market and reputational problems.  
The “cost skimping” hypothesis assumes that there is a trade-off between short-term 
cost efficiency and future risk-taking due to moral hazard considerations. In such cases, 
banks appear to be more cost efficient as they devote fewer resources to credit screening and 
monitoring. As a result the stock of non-performing loans remains unaffected in the short run. 
In the medium term however, banks reach higher risk levels as they have to purchase the 
additional inputs necessary to administer future higher risks. In the case of revenue 
efficiency, higher levels of short-term profits are normally obtained at the cost of laxer credit 
screening. This will also normally result in higher future risks. In other words, a bank may be 
tempted to increase revenues simply by taking on higher risks to compensate for lost returns. 
The “bad luck” hypothesis is related to the consequences of increases in bank risk on 
efficiency levels. It argues that external exogenous events (e.g., unexpected shocks) can 
precipitate increases in problem loans for the bank unrelated to managers’ skills or their risk-
taking appetite. These increases in risk result in additional costs and managerial effort. Thus, 
under this hypothesis, we expect increases in bank risk to precede falls in cost and revenue 
efficiency.  
The ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis suggests a negative causal relationship between capital 
and risk pointing out that bank managers have incentives to take on more risk particularly 
when the level of bank capital is low (or banks are more inefficient). The moral hazard 
hypothesis could arise in the presence of informational frictions and the existence of relevant 13
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‘agency problems’ between bank managers and owners (see Gorton and Rosen, 1995). A 
traditional moral hazard problem being when managers take-on risks that are borne entirely by 
the shareholders.
12 Better capitalised banks, in contrast, have less moral hazard incentives 
(Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) and are more prone to adopt careful practices to reduce costs 
(e.g. shareholders may be more active in controlling bank costs or capital allocation).   
Regulators can also force banks to increase the amount of capital commensurably with the 
amount of risk taken (Gropp and Heider, 2010). Holding additional capital buffers above the 
regulatory minimum for banks with higher levels of risk aims to avoid the costs associated 
with having to issue fresh equity at short notice (Ayuso et al., 2004; Peura and Keppo, 2006). 
As indicated by Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), banks could also respond to 
regulatory actions forcing them to hold more capital by increasing portfolio risk. 
  
4. Methodology  
 
We rely on Granger-Causality techniques to investigate the relationship between bank risk, capital 
and efficiency as this approach allows us to test unique time-ordered and signed relationships 
among pairs of variables.
13 While Granger-Causality tests have a number of limitations,
14 this 
approach has been widely used to analyze inter-temporal relationships in the economic 
literature (e.g. Jaeger and Paserman 2008, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach 2008, Amato 
and Swanson 2001 and Bajo-Rubio et al., 2001) as well as in banking studies (e.g. Fiordelisi 
                                                 
12 Bank managers may also have incentives to exploit flat rate deposit insurance schemes. 
13 Granger’s (1969, p. 428) notion of causality states that “… yt is causing xt if we are better able to predict xt using all 
available information than if the information apart from yt had been used”. Granger’s suggestion to regress xt on its own lags 
and a set of lagged yt has become a standard procedure. If lagged yt provides a statistically significant explanation of xt, yt 
“Granger” causes xt.  
14 Granger-testing does not prove economic causation between two variables but identifies gross statistical associations. 14
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and Molyneux 2010, Casu and Girardone 2009, Beccalli 2007, Williams, 2004, Levine et al., 
2000, Berger and DeYoung, 1997).  
In order to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank capital, efficiency and 
risk we estimate the following equations: 
 
Riski,t =  f1 (Riski,lag , x-effi,lag ,  τ-effi,lag , E/TAi,lag , Zi,t ) + εi,t  (1) 
x-effi,t =  f1 (Riski,lag , x-effi,lag ,  τ-effi,lag , E/TAi,lag , Zi,t ) + εi,t  (2) 
τ-effi,t =  f1 (Riski,lag , x-effi,lag ,  τ-effi,lag , E/TAi,lag , Zi,t ) + εi,t  (3) 
E/TAfi,t =  f1 (Riski,lag , x-effi,lag ,  τ-effi,lag , E/TAi,lag , Zi,t ) + εi,t   (4) 
 
where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, t denotes the 
time dimension, Risk is the variable accounting for bank’s risk, X-EFF and τ-EFF are the cost 
and revenue efficiency scores respectively. E/TA is the equity to total asset ratio while Z 
(j=1,…,4)  are control variables including factors influencing the efficiency-capital-risk 
relationship and ei,t is the random error term. The variable definitions are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >> 
 
Equation (1) tests if cost and revenue efficiency changes temporally precede 
variations in bank risk. Equations (2) and (3) assess if changes in bank risk temporally 
precede variations in cost and/or revenue efficiency and equation (4) considers whether bank 
capital levels temporally precede changes in risk. 15
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We use two lags and estimate an AR(2) process for the risk, capital and efficiency 
variables.
15 Following Casu and Girardone (2009), Granger causality is assessed as the joint 
test of the null hypothesis that the two lags are equal to zero. With the AR(2) process, we 
analyze Granger causality as the joint test that the two lags of each of the determinants is 
distributed as a chi-square (χ
2) with two degrees of freedom. If the probability is less than 
10%, then the null hypothesis that x  does not Granger-cause y  is rejected at the 10% 
significance level. We also assess the ‘long-run effect’ of x over the y by testing for the 
restriction that the sum of all lagged coefficients is zero: a rejection of the restriction implies 
that there is evidence of a long-run effect of x on y. 
  Various problems arise in the estimation of such a model.
16 The introduction of a 
lagged dependent variable among the predictors creates complications in the estimation as the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance (even under the assumption that 
εi,t is not itself correlated). To tackle this problem, we use the system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Hence we calculate the two-step system GMM 
estimator with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error to conduct our analysis.
17 
                                                 
15 We tested several specifications in terms of the number of lags (estimates available from the authors on request). Unlike 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) we resort to two lags which seem economically reasonable given the 
(annual) frequency of our data. We wish to thank the referee for this helpful comment. 
16 Various studies use the Granger causality test running OLS regressions (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004), 
while more recently the approach has been applied using dynamic panel estimators (e.g. Casu and Girardone, 2009). 
17The estimated asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM estimator are severely downward biased in small 
samples and sos we correct for this bias using the method proposed by Windmeijer (2005). 16
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5. Variables and data  
Measurement error can be one of the main problems encountered when assessing bank risk 
and efficiency. As bank risk is a crucial measure in our analysis we try to capture its main 
dimensions by using two major measures: the 5-year ahead cumulative Expected Default 
Frequency (EDF) for each bank calculated by Moody’s KMV and the traditional non-
performing loans to total loans ratio NPL\L. The EDF is a forward-looking measure and 
refers to the expected probability of default within the short-term (1-year ahead) accounting 
for all banks’ risks (i.e. not only credit risk). The EDF is a (well-known) indicator of credit 
risk, computed by Moody’s KMV and builds on Merton’s model to price corporate bond debt 
(Merton, 1974).
18 It uses data on stock market prices, banks’ balance-sheet information and 
Moody’s proprietary bankruptcy database. EDF  figures are regularly used by financial 
institutions, investors, central banks and regulators to monitor the health of individual banks 
as well as the financial system overall. We also use the Creditedge database to obtain the 5 
years ahead accumulated EDF. 
Previous studies (e.g. Berger and De Young, 1997, Williams 2004) focus on the non-
performing to total loans ratio (NPL) as a proxy for banks’ credit risk. While the NPL is a 
widely used accounting indicator of banks’ risk, this measure is subject to managerial 
discretion, focuses mostly on credit risk and is backward looking. Overall, both our measures 
of banks’ risk are complementary. While EDF is forward-looking and a broader measure of 
banks’ risks, NPL accounts for realized credit risk.  
Regarding bank efficiency, we estimate both cost and revenue efficiency estimators using 
the stochastic frontier approach (details are outlined in the Appendix). While previous studies 
mostly focus either on cost efficiency (e.g. Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997, Berger and DeYoung 
                                                 
18 Dwyer and Qu (2007) and Kealhofer (2003) provide further details on the construction of EDFs. For an empirical 
application of EDFs see, for instance, Garlappi et al. (2007). 17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1211
June 2010
 
1997, Williams 2004, Altunbas et al., 2007) or profit efficiency (Berger and Bonaccorsi 
2006), we estimate both the cost and revenue efficiency estimators as: 1) prior literature would 
suggest that risk and capital may have different relationship with revenue or cost efficiency; 2) we 
prefer to disentangle the concept of bank efficiency into cost and revenue elements rather than 
estimating an all-encompassing single profit efficiency measure (capturing jointly cost and revenue 
effects) and then its relationship with bank capital and risk. We also estimate profit efficiency as a 
robustness check. 
Bank capital adequacy is measured as the equity to assets ratio (E/TA), i.e. the value 
of total equity divided by the value of total assets. Equity capital is measured focusing on the 
Basel Committee definition of bank capital
19 by summing the TIER I (i.e. total equity, 
retained earnings and other disclosed equity reserves) and TIER II (i.e. undisclosed equity 
reserves, general provisions, hybrid capital instruments, and subordinated debts) components 
of bank capital. By focusing on a wider definition of banks’ equity, we aim to consider 
supplementary items that are commonly used by banks to increase their capital on top of 
traditional equity. This measure is able to capture better the concept of bank capital adequacy 
(and management) than the book value of equity (Santos, 1999, Diamond and Rajan, 2000). 
As a robustness check, we also use a narrower definition of bank capital defined as the core 
value of equity to total assets (EA/TA).  
We build on the previous literature to control for other factors that may influence the 
relationship between capital, risk and efficiency. Namely, we include a set of controls 
accounting for: 1) banks’ business model proxied using an income diversification variable (ID, 
i.e. the ratio between net non-interest income and net operating income);
20 2) market structure 
                                                 
19 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
20 Lepetit et al., (2008). 18
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by controlling for domestic concentration (CONC using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index) and 
number of credit institutions (Ln(NCI);
21 3) bank’s size (Ln(TA)logarithm of total assets).  
Turning to our sample, we focus on commercial banks from the European Union (EU-26)
22 
between 1995 and 2007.
23 We focus on commercial banks
24 as their behavior, incentives and 
competitive environment differ from saving banks, investment banks and other special financial 
institutions. Information on banks’ financial statements were obtained from Bankscope, a privately 
owned financial database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. Macroeconomic information is taken 
from Datastream (managed by Thompson Financial Limited) while estimates for the 5-year ahead 
expected default frequencies are calculated by Moodys-KMV. Our final sample comprises 1,987 
bank observations and mainly comprises French, UK, German, Italian and Spanish commercial 
banks (accounting for 14%, 10%, 9%, 8% and 8% of the observations, respectively).  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE >> 
 
Mean cost- and revenue- efficiencies range between 37% and 59%, whereas the average 
EDF are slightly lower than 1% while non-performing loans are less than 3.5% of total bank loans. 
Non-interest income accounts, on average, for 20% of net operating income whereas total loans are, 
on average, around 78% of total bank assets. Correlation among the variables is usually negligible 
suggesting that our models are unlikely to suffer from major multicollinearity problems.
25 
                                                 
21 These two measures are found to be negatively correlated, but the magnitude of the Pearson correlation coefficient (i.e. -
0.5027) suggest no serious multicollineary problems. 
22 Due to the specialist offshore business of Luxembourg banks these were excluded from the sample. 
23 We focus on this time period since data prior to 1995 (especially on the EDF) is often not available and after 2007 the 
implementation of the Basel II capital accord might have complicated the interpretation of the relationships. Overall, it has to 
be borne in mind that for most of this period credit risk has been at relatively benign levels. 
24 As defined by Bankscope. 
25 Estimated correlations coefficients are available upon request from the authors 19
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We report the results from models (1)-(4) using two lags on equity capital, cost efficiency, 
revenue efficiency and bank risk in table 3, where bank risk is measured using EDF (i.e. the 
1-year ahead expected default frequency), the EDF5Y (i.e. the 5-year ahead expected default 
frequency) and the NPL/L (i.e. the ratio of non-performing to total loans).  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
 
Cost (x-eff) and revenue (τ-eff) efficiencies are found to negatively Granger-cause bank’s 
EDF (i.e. y=EDF in table 3). Our results show that a decline in the sum of the lagged 
efficiency coefficients, i.e. the ‘long-run effect’ (for both cost and revenue efficiency, 
respectively) temporally precede an increase in the EDF. This suggests that  reductions in 
bank efficiency (either cost or revenue) Granger cause a higher probability of default – this 
confirms the “bad management” hypothesis and is in-line with the earlier findings of Berger 
and De Young (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Williams (2004) 
We also find a negative statistically significant (at the 1% level) link between EDF 
and the concentration index showing that bank risks are lower in more concentrated markets 
(i.e. less concentrated – possibly more competitive – banking systems might be less stable in 
the long-run in line with Boyd and Nicolo, 2003). These conclusions are also supported when 
an accounting measure is used to assess bank risk. In the NPL/L model (i.e. y=NPL/L in table 
3): cost and revenue efficiency declines temporally precede NPL increases. There is also a 
negative link between the NPL/L ratio and the concentration index. When bank risk is 
measured using the EDF5Y (so over a long-term horizon), we find no relationship between 
industry structure and risk suggesting that effects get blurred in terms of long-run risk 
expectations. 20
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We show that the capital ratio (E/TA) is found to positively Granger-cause cost 
efficiencies (x-eff) (statistically significant at 5% or less) in all the model (2) estimations (i.e. 
y=x-eff in table 3). Namely, an increase in the sum of the lagged capital ratio coefficients 
temporally precede cost efficiency increases although there is no impact on risk. This 
suggests that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital increases and these banks 
are more likely to reduce costs (e.g. shareholder may be more active in controlling bank costs 
or capital allocation) than thinly capitalised banks. These conclusions are independent from 
the bank risk measure adopted in estimating model (2): namely, the long-run positive 
causation effect between capital and cost efficiency is found in all models using different 
definitions of bank risk (i.e. EDF, EDF5Y, NPL/L). We also find a positive statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) link between cost efficiency and the number of credit institutions 
(NCI) suggesting that cost efficiency levels are positively linked to the number of competitors 
in the market (supporting the view that competition makes banks more cost effective). We 
also find a negative statistically significant (at the 5% level or less) link between cost 
efficiency and income diversification (ID) suggesting that more specialised banks benefit 
from scale and learning economies that enable them to reduce costs more than their 
diversified counterparts. These conclusions are also independent from the bank risk measure 
adopted. 
  We also show that the cost efficiency indicator (x-eff) is found to positively Granger-
cause bank’s capital (E/TA) (statistically significant at 10% or less) in all the models (4) 
estimations (i.e. y=E/TA  in table 3). Increases in the sum of the lagged cost efficiency 
coefficients temporally precede equity ratio increases and the result holds for all bank risk 
measures (i.e. EDF, EDF5Y, NPL/L) used in estimating model (4). This finding is consistent 
with Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) where short-term cost efficiency 
gains (driven by reducing loan underwriting, monitoring and control costs) would feed 21
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through into higher capital. This is probably because more efficient banks have higher 
earnings which Granger-cause increases in capital. 
  We also find a positive statistically significant (at the 1% level) link between the 
capital ratio and the number of credit institutions (NCI) tentatively suggesting that high 
capital levels are positively linked to the number of competitors in the market (so supporting 
the view that bank competition might encourage higher equity capital levels).  
  Surprisingly and unlike most of the previous literature we find no strong causal 
relationship between capital and risk (when measured using EDF or EDF5Y) for our period of 
study. There is however evidence of positive bi-directional Granger causality when NPL/L is 
our risk measure. This suggests that capital is more likely to be related to past credit risks 
than broader-based (future) banking risks.  
 
7. Robustness tests 
In order to confirm the validity of the aforementioned findings, we conducted a number of 
robustness checks. Firstly, we calculate the equity ratio in a standard accounting way (EA/TA) 
by focussing on the book value of total equity (rather than the Basel Committee capital 
definition) and we re-estimate models (1) to (4). As in table 3, table 4 reports all the results 
obtained from estimating models (1)-(4) using the three different measures of bank risk (i.e. 
the EDF, the EDF5Y and the NPL/L). While we are able to confirm that cost efficiency (x-eff) 
and revenue efficiency (τ-eff) negatively Granger-cause bank’s EDF and NPL/L (statistically 
significant at 10% or less), in the estimation of model (1) we cannot confirm our previous 
results concerning capital ratios. We find no evidence of Granger-causation between our 
narrow measure of capital (EA/TA) and bank cost efficiencies. This suggests that the use of 
supplementary capital items such as subordinated debt and hybrid capital instruments 
(commonly used by European banks) may influence capital cost efficiency relationships. As 22
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in our previous results we find little relationship between equity capital and risk apart from 
evidence that EDF negatively causes equity capital – higher long-run risk seems to Granger 
cause reductions in equity capital over time although we find no such relationship for our 
other risk measures.   
 
<<INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
 
  Secondly, we also estimate profit efficiency (rather than cost and revenue efficiency 
as noted above) and re-estimate models (1) to (4). Our results (table 5) show that profit 
efficiency (π-eff) is found to positively Granger-cause bank’s capital (E/TA) (statistically 
significant at 10% or less) in all the model (4) estimations (i.e. y=E/TA in table 5). This result 
is consistent with the positive causation between cost efficiency and the capital-asset ratio. 
We also find evidence that profit efficiency negatively Granger-causes (at the 10% 
confidence level) bank’s EDF or NPL/L in the model (1) estimations. As in Table 3 we also 
find a bi-directional causal relationship between capital and NPL/L.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
 
  Thirdly, we re-estimate equations (1)-(4) positing a AR(4) lag structure for bank risk, capital 
and efficiency. This change has substantial effects on our sample composition by reducing the 
number of bank observations from 1,987 to 667. As shown in table 6, the AR(4) specification 
cannot be safely assumed since longer lags may be weak instruments. As expected, test 
statistics are found to be insignificant at three and four lags and, overall, we find little 
evidence to support the claim that causal relationships exist (in the long run) beyond a single 
or two-lag (i.e. two years) period.  23
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<<INSERT TABLE 6 >> 
 
8. Conclusions  
We assess the inter-temporal relationships among bank efficiency, capital and risk for the 
European commercial banking industry. We build on previous work using Granger-causality 
methods (Berger and De Young 1997, Williams 2004) in a panel data framework. Our model 
delves into the relationships by including several definitions of bank efficiency (i.e. cost, 
revenue and profit efficiency scores), risk (i.e. non-performing loans and probability of 
default) and capital (i.e. core equity and total capital).  
In general, our results show that subdued bank efficiency (cost or revenue) Granger 
causes risk supporting the “bad management” and the “efficiency version of the moral 
hazard” hypotheses. We also show that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency 
improvements suggesting that moral hazard incentives appear to fall as bank capital 
increases. Better capitalized banks are more likely to reduce their costs compared to their 
thinly capitalized counterparts. Cost (and profit) efficiencies are also found to positively 
Granger-cause bank capital. In other words more efficient banks seem to eventually become 
better capitalized and higher capital levels also tend to have a positive effect on efficiency 
levels. 
We find only limited evidence of relationships between capital and risk in line with 
the moral hazard hypothesis. The main finding seems to be a bi-directional causal link 
between capital and our accounting measure of risk (NPL/L). There is little evidence of any 
strong causal link between capital (total capital or equity capital) and our market-based bank 
risk indicators.  
Overall we believe our results to be particularly interesting from a prudential 24
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supervisory perspective. The findings showing that lower efficiency scores (either cost or 
revenue) suggest greater future risks and efficiency improvements tend to shore up banks’ 
capital positions. Our findings also emphasize the importance of attaining long-term 
efficiency gains to support financial stability objectives.  25
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Variables  Symbol  Description 
Cost Efficiency   x-eff  Estimated using Stochastic Frontier analysis.
(*
) 
Revenue Efficiency   τ-eff  Estimated using Stochastic Frontier analysis.
(*
) 
Profit Efficiency   π-eff  Estimated using Stochastic Frontier analysis.
(*
) 
Non Performing Loans   NPL/L  Non-performing loans over the total gross value of total bank loans.
(1) 
 
1-Year Ahead Expected 
Default Frequency™ 
EDF  Probability that a company (bank) will default within a year.
 (2) 
 
5-Years Ahead Expected 
Default Frequency™ 
EDF5Y  Cumulative probability that a company (bank) will default within 5 years.
(3) 
 
Capital to Asset Ratio  E/TA 
Value of total equity divided by total assets. Equity capital is measured focusing 
on the Basel Committee definition of capital by summing total equity, retained 
earnings, general banking risk reserves, other equity reserves, hybrid capital 
instruments and subordinated debts.
(1) 
Book value of Capital  
to Asset Ratio  EA/TA  Total equity divided by total assets. Equity capital is measured by the book 
value of total equity.
(1)  
Income Diversification  ID  Net non-interest income to net operating income.
(1) 
 
Bank Asset Size  BAS  BAS is the Euro value of its total assets.
(1) 
 
Domestic Banking Industry 
Concentration  CONC  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
(4) 
 
Number of Credit Institutions  NCI  NCI is the number of credit institutions.
(5) 
Interest Rate  IR  3-month money market interest rate.
(6) 
 
GDP Per-capita  Ln(GDPP)   Natural logarithm of the domestic GDP (in Euro) divided by the number of 
inhabitants.
(6)  
GDP Annual Growth Rate  GDPG   Domestic GDP growth rate between two consecutive years.
(6) 
Population Density  Ln(POPD)  Natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants per Km.
2 (6) 
 
*  More detail for the estimation procedures are provided in the Annex. 
1) Source of data: Bankscope. 
2) Source of data: KMV-Moody’s. 
3) Source of data: KMV-Moody’s. 
4) Source of data: ECB, EU Banking Structures, reports. 
5) Source of data: ECB, MFI statistical reports. 











The evolution of the main variables (Mean values) used to analyse the sample of EU-26 area 
banks over the period 1995-2007 (1,987 year-observations) 
 
   x-EFF  τ-EFF  π-EFF EDF  EDF5Y  NPL/L  E/TA  ID  BAS
(*
)
1995 0.5148  0.6095  0.5200 0.0031 0.0049 0.0334 0.0865 0.1285  327.990
1996 0.4801  0.5967  0.4954 0.0042 0.0043 0.0366 0.0769 0.1433  307.286
1997 0.4899  0.6218  0.5247 0.0038 0.0049 0.0354 0.0697 0.1656  403.618
1998 0.4785  0.6267  0.5211 0.0042 0.0043 0.0356 0.0668 0.1686  377.709
1999 0.4726  0.6336  0.5339 0.0047 0.0043 0.0343 0.0685 0.1800  336.366
2000 0.4771  0.6309  0.5320 0.0042 0.0052 0.0343 0.0687 0.1916  428.367
2001 0.4591  0.6304  0.5336 0.0073 0.0060 0.0354 0.0699 0.2002  343.293
2002 0.4520  0.6355  0.5500 0.0084 0.0068 0.0364 0.0689 0.2068  345.334
2003 0.4458  0.6341  0.5436 0.0101 0.0090 0.0355 0.0702 0.2047  377.329
2004 0.4215  0.6254  0.5333 0.0070 0.0061 0.0341 0.0706 0.2248  552.397
2005 0.4238  0.6285  0.5343 0.0058 0.0077 0.0333 0.0748 0.2228  708.129
2006 0.4188  0.6204  0.5284 0.0087 0.0083 0.0328 0.0747 0.2107  792.808
2007 0.4170  0.6529  0.5333 0.0042 0.0074 0.0301 0.0763 0.1860  902.372
Total 0.4446  0.6311  0.5342 0.0067 0.0067 0.0342 0.0715 0.2014  579.947
(*) Values are in Euro millions 
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Granger causality for the relationship among banking capital, efficiency and risk-taking in the 
EU-26 commercial banking 
 
  Models where Risk = EDF    Models where Risk = EDF5Y    Models where Risk = NPL/L  
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample period:  1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007






169.92 196.61 173.82 212.72 187.94 187.66 153.39 258.27 179.88 192.63 182.97 200.97
AB test AR(1)
   -3.73*** -3.21*** -5.06*** -8.71*** -5.86*** -3.15*** -4.98*** -8.04*** -4.21*** -3.16*** -4.77*** -8.71***
AB test AR(2)  0.98 -0.09 -0.21 1.43 2.77*** -0.07 -0.01 1.98** -0.68 -0.43 -0.41 1.09
Note:  We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets).  
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
The variables Risktotal , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal  and E/Atotal  are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the cost efficiency, the revenue 
efficiency and the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y. A 
coefficient greater than zero show a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero show a negative causation from the x to the y. 
  The Sargan/Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid.  
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Table 4 
Robustness check: Granger causality for the relationship among capital (using the Equity to Total 
Assets ratio), efficiency and credit risk in the EU-26 commercial banking  
 
  Models where Risk = EDF    Models where Risk = EDF5Y    Models where Risk = NPL/L  
Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample period:  1995-2007 1995-2007  1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007






174.23 213.16  180.06 172.17 177.85 195.09 176.20 173.75 183.73 195.04 185.62 170.90
AB test AR(1)
   -3.77*** -3.16***  -4.99*** -3.19*** -5.64*** -3.15*** -5.00*** -2.99*** -4.04*** 3.11*** -4.95*** -3.11***
AB test AR(2)  1.01  0.07 -0.09 -0.78 2.55** -0.02 0.10 -0.68 -0.96 -0.33 0.33  -0.90
Note:  We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets).  
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
The variables Risktotal , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal  and E/Atotal  are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the cost efficiency, the revenue 
efficiency and the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.  
A coefficient greater than zero shows a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero shows a negative causation from the x to the y. 
  The Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying restrictions 
are valid.  
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation.
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Table 5 
Robustness check: Granger causality for the relationship among capital, efficiency (measured 
using profit efficiency) and credit risk in the EU-26 commercial banking  
 
  Models where Risk = EDF    Models where Risk = EDF5Y    Models where Risk = NPL/L 
  Model (1) Model (5) Model (4) Model (1) Model (5) Model (4) Model (1) Model (5) Model (4)





























































































































































































































































Sample period:  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007 





2(246)  179.06  191.66  286.49  192.52  196.69  256.10  187.93  198.58  289.15 
AB test AR(1)
  
-3.76***  -3.47***  -8.50***  -6.02***  -3.43***  -8.10***  -4.40***  -3.43***  -8.59*** 
AB test AR(2)  1.14  -1.78  0.54  2.72***  -1.47  1.47  -0.87  -1.83*  0.49 
Note:  We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets).  
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
The variables Risktotal , π-efftotal  and E/Atotal  are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the profit efficiency and the equity-
asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.  
A coefficient greater than zero shows a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero shows a negative causation from the x to the y. 
  The Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid.  
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Table 6 
Robustness check: Granger causality for the relationship among capital, efficiency and credit risk in 
the EU-26 commercial banking assuming a AR(4) structure  
 
  Models where Risk = EDF    Models where Risk = EDF5Y    Models where Risk = NPL/L  
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample period:  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007  1995-2007  1995-2007 1995-2007





2(208)  130.72 130.74 109.40 157.20 132.10 124.18 107.49 144.10 127.53 128.15 112.51 155.42
AB test AR(1)
   -2.83*** -2.24** -3.49** -5.35*** -3.79*** -2.26*** -3.26*** -5.46*** -3.24*** -2.31*** -3.40*** -5.15***
AB test AR(2)  -1.09 -0.68 -0.08 -2.21** -0.13 -0.62 0.04 -1.06 -0.72 -0.76 -0.18 -2.43**
Note:  We use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (20005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets).  
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
The variables Risktotal , , x-efftotal , ⎮ -efftotal and E/Atotal  are the estimated coefficients for the test that the sum of the four lagged terms (for the bank risk-taking, the profit efficiency and 
the equity-asset ratio variables, respectively) is equal to zero. A significance level lower than 10% enables to reject the null hypothesis of no causality from the x to the y.  
A coefficient greater than zero shows a positive causation from the x to the y; a coefficient smaller than zero shows a negative causation from the x to the y. 
  The Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null hypothesis is that instruments used are not correlated with residuals and so the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid.  
Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression do not exhibit second order serial 
correlation. 35
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Cost efficiency is measured using the Stochastic Frontier (SF) analysis. Namely, the Battese 
and Coelli’s (1995) stochastic frontier model is estimated: 
Ln TCi,t = xi,t ® + (Vi,t + Ui,t)  (2) 
 
where t denotes the time dimension, ln TCi is the logarithm of the cost of production of 
the i-th bank, xi is a kx1 vector of standardised input prices and output of the i-th bank, ® is a 
vector of unknown parameters, Vi is a random variable, which is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed 
as a N(0,⌠
2
v) and independent of Ui. Ui is a non-negative random variable, which is assumed to 
account for the cost inefficiency in production and is assumed to be i.i.d. as truncations at zero 
of the N(⎧,⌠U
2) distribution, ⎧ is a parameter to be estimated. We use the following translog 
functional form
26 to estimate a common benchmark frontier in the EU26
27: 
                                                 
26 The choice of the use of translog is motivated by two reasons. First, Altunbas and Chakravraty (2001) identified 
some problems associated with using the Fourier functional form, especially when dealing with heterogeneous data 
sets. Secondly, Berger and Mester (1997) observe that the translog functional form and Fourier-flexible form are 
substantially equivalent from an economic viewpoint and both rank individual bank efficiency in almost the same 
order. 
27 We would like to thank the referee for suggesting this approach. Following the work of Bos (2009), we estimate a 
common benchmark frontier in the EU-26. We include three environmental variables (z) and use them for modelling 
the inefficiency distribution without directly including these in the production frontier in order to reduce the 
heterogeneity in our data set. The inefficiency components ui are assumed to be distributed independently, but not 
identically. For each i-th firm the technical inefficiency effect is obtained as truncation at zero of a normal distribution 
N(µi, σ
2) where the mean µi is a function of M factors representing the firm specific environment: 
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lnTC = α0 + α i ln yi
i=1
3
∑ + βi ln wi +τ 1
i=1
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+ ρij ln yi ln w j
j=1
3
∑ + ψ i ln yi ln E
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+ θi ln wi ln E
j=1
3
∑ + ϑi Tl nw i
j=1
3
∑ + ln uc + lnε c
  (3)
 
where TC is the logarithm of the cost of production, yi (i=1, 2, 3) are output quantities, 
wj (j=1, 2, 3) are input prices, ln E is the natural logarithm of total equity capital, T is the time 
trend, uc are the cost inefficiency components. In order guarantee the linear homogeneity in 
factor prices. That is:  
       
it is necessary (and sufficient) to apply the following restrictions: 1) the standard 




 2) linear restriction of the cost function. 
                                                                                                                                                   
In particular, we take into account economic growth (LnGDPP) and prosperity (GDP per-capita). We also 
include a demographic variable that may impact on the bank delivery channels (i.e. population density - POPD) and 
money market interest rates IR (a proxy for the stance of monetary policy). These macro factors include GDP pro-
capita (Z1), Population density (Z2) and Short term Interest rates (Z3). In this way, we assume that all banks in our 
sample share the same technology and environmental factors influence only the distance between each firm and the best 
practice. 37
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Bank inputs and outputs are defined according to the value-added approach, 
originally proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1992). We posit that labour, physical 
capital and financial capital are inputs
28, whereas demand deposits (y1), total loans (y2) 
and other earning assets (y3) are outputs
29. We also estimate the alternative revenue 
efficiency measures: in this “alternative” approach, banks take input and output quantities 
as given and we selected these measures since prices are often inaccurately measured in 
banking.
30 The revenue efficiency is estimated using the same translog functional model 
adopted for the cost efficiency, by using as dependent variable the total bank’s revenue in 
the revenue function. The bank input and output definition adopted is the same adopted to 
estimate the cost efficiency. 
                                                 
28 Input prices are obtained as total personnel expenses over total assets (w1) , total depreciation and other capital 
expenses over total fixed assets (w2) and total interest rate expenses over total funds (w3). 
29 This selection of inputs and outputs follows the studies by Sathye (2001) and Dietsch and Lozano (2000), Aly et al. 
(1990) and Hancock (1986), wherein the author develops a methodology based on user costs to determine the outputs 
and inputs of a banking firm. Although off-balance sheet (OBS) items may play a role in generating bank value-added, we omit 
to consider OBS items since our sample also includes small banks that do not have OBS items or data are not available in the 
Bankscope database. By including the OBS in the output selection, the sample size would have been substantially reduced, 
especially because we use a AR(3) process in model (1). 
30 Berger and Mester (1997, p. 904) notes that “if prices are inaccurately measured –as is likely, given the available 
banking data – the predicted part of the standard profit function would explain less of the variance of profits and yield 
more error in the estimation of the efficiency terms ln u. In this event, it may be appropriate to try specifying other 
variables in the profit function that might yield a better fit, such as the output quantity vector, y, as in the alternative 
profit function”. Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo